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Social neuroscience studies the neurobiological underpinnings of people making sense of
people. Due to both conceptual and methodological constraints, the majority of studies
in this field of research, however, has employed experimental paradigms that focus
on social cognition from an observer’s rather than from an interactor’s point of view
(offline vs. online social cognition). This calls for an increased effort to systematically
investigate the neural bases of participation in real-time social interaction. In light of
the ontogenetic primacy of social interaction over observation and the idea that neural
networks established during social interaction may be “re-used” during observation, other
important objectives of the field will be to relate new findings into the neural bases of
social interaction to previous work investigating the neural bases of social observation as
well as to find ways to directly compare the two.
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SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES
Social neuroscience has come a long way since its inception
(Frith and Frith, 1999; Ochsner and Lieberman, 2001) and has
helped to characterize the neurobiological bases of various aspects
of social cognition. In particular the advent, refinement and
more wide-spread use of functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) has furthered insight into mapping social cognitive
capacities onto brain areas and neural networks. In the pro-
cess, two large-scale neural networks have taken center stage as
the neurobiological substrate of social cognition: the so-called
“mirror neuron system” (MNS) and the so-called “mentalizing
network” (MENT). The MNS has been taken as evidence for
a first-person or simulationist account of social cognition. By
activating brain areas that would be necessary to exhibit motor
behavior onself, the MNS is believed to provide an implicit, first-
person grasp of others’ behavior (Caspers et al., 2010; Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia, 2010). The MENT, on the other hand, has often
been taken as evidence for a third-person or theorist account of
social cognition. It is believed by many to provide inferences with
regard to the mental states that govern observed behavior and
thereby help to explain and predict behavior (e.g., Frith and Frith,
2010). The apparent disparity in these research results can be
traced back to both conceptual and methodological constraints,
which have affected and shaped the experimental paradigms
that have most often been used (cf. Keysers and Gazzola, 2007;
Schilbach, 2010; Pfeiffer et al., 2013a; Schilbach et al., 2013). In
light of the fact that both simulationist and theorist accounts
have been described as spectator theories of social cognition,
which are committed to an observer epistemology according to
which knowing others is limited to perceiving them, it comes as
no surprise that the neuroimaging paradigms used to provide
empirical evidence ask subjects to observe others and/or think
about their mental states rather than engage in direct inter-
action with them. In other words the employed experimental
paradigms have focused on social cognition from an observer’s
(i.e., offline social cognition) rather than from an interactor’s
point of view (i.e., online social cognition; Schilbach et al., 2012,
2013). Consequently, it remains unclear (i) whether and how
neural activity and connectivity in these canonical networks is
modulated by the degree of participation in an ongoing inter-
action and (ii) whether the networks subserve complementary
or mutually exclusive roles (Schilbach, 2010; Schilbach et al.,
2013).
Until today, the neural mechanisms underlying actual social
interactions in real life, therefore, are insufficiently understood.
Importantly, this is not only problematic for fundamental social
neuroscience research itself. Also, translational social neuro-
science approaches, which aim at understanding the prevalent
and fundamental deficits of interpersonal behavior associated
with psychiatric disorders (e.g., Crespi and Badcock, 2008;
Tost and Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012) and at improving thera-
peutic interventions by means of neuroimaging (e.g., Linden,
2006) may be impeded by a lack of ecological validity (cf.
Insel, 2010). In particular and despite its obvious merits, much
of the current work on socio-cognitive aberrations in clinical
populations may have over-emphasized explicit forms of social
cognition, e.g., the conscious effort to think about another per-
son’s mental states, their neural correlates and their relation-
ship to socially (in-) adequate behavior (cf. Schilbach et al.,
2013). There is, however, mounting evidence that interpersonal
difficulties might be more closely linked to impairments of
social interaction, i.e., abilities and skills to unreflectively and
yet successfully deal with others under the time constraints of
an ongoing social exchange, rather than impairments of social
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observation, which are less pronounced in many clinical groups
(Klin et al., 2003; Senju et al., 2009; Schilbach et al., 2012;
Rietveld et al., 2013). This realization may also be of particular
importance for psychotherapeutic interventions, which, in part,
are beginning to focus more on the procedural nature of and
skills associated with social interaction (e.g., McCullough et al.,
2011).
An important avenue for future research in social neuro-
science, therefore, consists in systematically investigating the neu-
ral basis of active participation in real-time social interaction.
This endeavor has been described as the development towards
a “second-person neuroscience”, which -according to some—
promises to provide new insights into how activity in large-scale
neural networks is modulated by social interactions (cf. Heyes,
2010, 2013; Gallese, 2013; Schilbach et al., 2013). Furthermore,
the second-person view may hold some potential to reconcile
current controversy between polarized versions of interactionist
(Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012) and individualistic (Gallotti
and Frith, 2013) approaches of social cognition by providing
an account of how cognitive functions develop in the context
and by virtue of interaction with others (Timmermans et al.,
2013). Importantly, this is not meant to rule out the existence
of an “observation” mode of social cognition as we can cer-
tainly infer things about others when we are observing them
and make use of our ability to simulate others’ mental states
as well (e.g., Waytz and Mitchell, 2011; Paulus et al., 2013),
but rather to stress that it is the emergence of the capacity for
reasoning about people, for inference and simulation that needs
to be investigated and understood as resulting from our prior
ability to interact with them and not how social actions and
interactions emerge from our capacity to represent knowledge
about others.
In essence, the second-person approach suggests that social
cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction
with others rather than merely observing them, thereby pointing
towards the importance of experiencing and interacting with
others as our primary ways of knowing them (Schilbach et al.,
2013): on this view, firstly, awareness of other minds is thought
to hinge upon emotional engagement and a responsiveness to
another person’s states or actions as compared to a detached
observer’s attitude, which does not include such responding (cf.
Reddy, 2003). Here, emotional responses are thought to constitute
an important way of perceiving and integrating the state of the
other by way of experiencing one’s own bodily responses to
her (e.g., Schilbach et al., 2008). Secondly, the process of social
interaction is seen as a key constituent of grasping other minds.
Social interactions are characterized by reciprocal relations with
the perception of socially relevant information prompting (re-)
actions, which are themselves reacted to. In social interaction,
it has been suggested, we rely upon our practical “know-how”
in dealing with others (Klin et al., 2003). Here, interaction
and feedback from the other are not only a way of gathering
“data” about the other person, but—in part—one’s knowledge
of the other may reside in the interaction dynamics between the
agents (e.g., Froese et al., 2014). Compatible with a Wittgen-
steinian perspective, this account also suggests that psychological
concepts gain meaning by how they are used in everyday life
encounters rather than being reliant on ontologically private
states (Wittgenstein, 1953/2001). From this perspective, spectator
theories of social cognition incorrectly assume that social cogni-
tion is grounded in inferences about others’ minds. Rather social
cognition occurs within and is motivated by social interaction
(Moore, 2013).
Consequently, a most important objective for a “second-
person neuroscience” will have to be to shed new light onto the
question of how particular cognitive functions actually are real-
ized in particular areas of the brain of an interactor (or the brains
of interactors) and continue to be modulated by participation
in social interaction (cf. Westermann et al., 2007; Heyes, 2013).
By aiming for this goal, this line of research could also close in
on another hugely important topic in developmental psychol-
ogy and social neuroscience, namely the relationship between
the neural correlates of social interaction and the neural cor-
relates of social observation. Developmental psychology clearly
suggests a primacy of social interaction as the motor for devel-
opmental change, but also highlights the importance of social
observation skills for learning. Here, an important suggestion
is that the implicit processes relevant for participation in real-
time social interaction with others may constitute our primary
way of knowing them (Reddy, 2008) and that more explicit
forms of self- and other-related knowledge may be accrued fol-
lowing and resulting from such interactions (e.g., Timmermans
et al., 2012, 2013). Based on this assumed trajectory, one could
postulate that neural networks relevant for social cognition are
ontogenetically trained during social interactions, whereas later
developing competencies of more detached, observational and
finally reflective social cognition might be a result of reactivating
the networks forged during social interactions. This suggestion,
in fact, links up neatly with theories about the functional struc-
ture of the brain, which take the “re-use” of neural circuitry
for various cognitive purposes to be a central organizational
principle (e.g., Anderson, 2010). According to these theories, it
is common for neural circuits to be established for one purpose
and then to be put to different uses. Crucially, the relevant
changes in neural network architecture could be brought about
by the increasingly complex interactive social contexts, which
create the possibility and need to communicate with respect to
an external, third object or person (cf. Carpendale and Lewis,
2004). Furthermore, the involvement of reward signals during
an ongoing social interaction might also be relevant (Guionnet
et al., 2012; Baez-Mendoza and Schultz, 2013). Yet, to the best
of my knowledge, no neuroscientific evidence exists to directly
address these questions, despite the potentially far-reaching con-
ceptual and clinical implications. In the following, I will, there-
fore, present some ideas for future research and study designs,
which could help to investigate the neural correlates of social
interaction and social observation as well as their putatively close
relationship.
IDEAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
INVESTIGATING THE NEUROBIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF SOCIAL
INTERACTION AND OBSERVATION
With regard to the neuroscientific question of whether or not
similarities and/or differences between interaction-based and
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observation-based neural networks can be detected, an important
challenge consists in finding neuroimaging-compatible experi-
mental tasks, which allow for active participation in an ecolog-
ically valid way. To this end, we have developed a technique
that uses eyetracking data obtained from participants inside the
MR scanner to make a virtual character’s gaze behavior respon-
sive to the participant’s gaze in real-time (Wilms et al., 2010).
This setup, therefore, allows participants to experience their own
eye-movements to have an effect on the gaze behavior of a
(virtual) other, similar to how this may occur in real-life situa-
tions. This “interactive eyetracking” setup has been successfully
used to perform fMRI studies, in which participants interacted
with a virtual agent while undergoing neuroimaging. During
one particular study, the gaze-based interaction included looking
at objects “together” with the agent, thereby engaging in what
is commonly described as “joint attention”, i.e., interpersonally
shared visual attention, or looking at objects other than the one
the virtual agent was looking at (Schilbach et al., 2010). Results
of a univariate neuroimaging analysis demonstrated a differential
increase of neural activity in brain regions that are commonly
ascribed to the MENT during joint attention (i.e., looking at
the same objects as compared to looking at different objects),
such as dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the precuneus, irre-
spective of whether or not joint attention was initiated by the
participant or the virtual other. Looking at an object different
from the one looked at by the virtual other led to the recruit-
ment of a fronto-parietal network. In spite of the participants
fixating objects in all experimental conditions, the underlying
brain activity, therefore, was markedly different depending upon
whether or not the participant was doing this “together” with
the virtual other or not. Interestingly, activation differences in
the MENT were observed even though participants were given
no instruction to think about the mental states of the other.
In fact, participants did not have any reason to do so. In the
instructions they had been told that the virtual character seen
on screen was controlled by another human participant, who
was given instructions to behave in a certain way. These find-
ings, therefore, contradict the idea that activity changes of the
MENT are necessarily associated with reflective or explicit social
cognition, but rather demonstrate that activity changes in this
network can also be brought about by participation in reciprocal
social interaction. This automatic activation of the MENT during
joint attention with another agent could, therefore, be taken to
suggest that activity in the MENT can be shaped and modulated
during gaze-based social interaction. Furthermore, the results
demonstrated a significant difference in the neural processes of
joint attention that were dependent upon joint attention being
self- as compared to other-initiated: here, a differential effect was
found in the nucleus accumbens bilaterally, which is known to
be an important component of reward-based neurocircuitry (e.g.,
Peters and Büchel, 2009). Also, activity change in this region was
positively correlated with a pleasantness rating that subjects were
asked to provide after the scan and during which they indicated
that they enjoyed watching the objects more “together” with the
virtual agent.
Future research could make use of these interaction-
based paradigms to compare brain activity changes during
gaze-based interaction to activity changes during social
observation (Figure 1). This could, for instance, be realized
by providing a replay of a virtual character’s gaze behavior
to participants as obtained during an interaction task to
another group of participants undergoing neuroimaging. In
the latter group, participants’ gaze behavior will, therefore, not
produce any behavioral changes in the virtual other while using
identical stimulus material, thereby eliminating the interaction
contingency (see arrows, Figure 1). Furthermore, future research
could also help to address differences between more structured,
turn-taking types of interactions as compared to fully dynamic
encounters and could focus in greater detail on effects of
congruency, i.e., whether or not interactors perform similar,
different or complementary actions. The latter distinction might
also help to better understand the putative difference between
social interaction and observation as those could be related to
specific action tendencies.
Another extension of this line of research could consist in
combining gaze-based interaction tasks with subsequently pre-
sented or interleaved tasks that measure pro-social tendencies
and behavior, self-perception, social decision-making and advice-
taking, in-group and out-group biases and gaze cueing (as com-
pared to non-social cueing) effects (cf. Engemann et al., 2012).
By doing so, the effects of social interaction on how we view
ourselves and others and how we behave towards them could be
examined. Also, the effects of participation in social interaction
as compared to the effects of social observation on how we view
the worlds and the decisions we make in it could be studied.
Acquiring behavioral and neuroimaging measures both during
the interaction task and the subsequently presented tasks would
allow to investigate the modulatory impact of social interaction
both on a behavioral and neural level as well as to use behavioral
and neural markers obtained during the interaction as a predic-
tor for performance and psychophysiological change during the
subsequently presented tasks.
INVESTIGATING THE RELATIONSHIP OF NEUROBIOLOGICAL
CORRELATES OF SOCIAL INTERACTION AND OBSERVATION
As outlined above, another important question for the field
of social neuroscience consists in asking not only how neural
networks may be differentially engaged during real-time social
interaction, but also whether and how these networks may also be
involved in social observation and explicit social cognition. In this
respect, it appears particularly relevant that an argument based on
mere topography might not suffice. As discussed above, already
today evidence exists to demonstrate that participation in gaze-
based social interaction (e.g., looking at the same object together
with another person in the absence of a necessity to think about
the mental states of that other person) can lead to a differential
increase of neural activity in the MENT (Schilbach et al., 2010)
while the same brain regions are also activated during Theory of
Mind-like tasks, which require explicitly thinking about another
person’s mental states (e.g., Vogeley et al., 2001). Therefore, the
investigation of the relationship between the neural correlates of
social interaction and social observation will also have to take
into account how the brain represents the social world rather than
(exclusively) where in the brain the social world is represented.
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic depiction of an empirical approach to
investigate the relationship of the neural correlates of social
interaction and observation. (A) Study participant (left) is involved in a
gaze-based social interaction task with either a socially responsive virtual
character (via “interactive eyetracking”, see Section Investigating the
Neurobiological Correlates of Social Interaction and Observation) or an
agent controlled by another human participant (via “dual eyetracking”, see
Section Tackling the “Two-Brain Challenge”) while undergoing
neuroimaging. During the interaction the task-relevant gaze behavior of
both participants is being recorded. (B) In a separate group of
participants, replays of task-relevant gaze behavior from the social
interaction task are presented to a participant, who is asked to perform
the same task, but rely upon the gaze behavior shown to him on the
video screen. Here, again the participant’s brain (left) is investigated by
means of neuroimaging to allow (e.g.,) for a group-based comparison
between the neural correlates of social interaction and observation.
Legend: R: (re-) actions performed by agents. Dotted lines in schematic
depiction of interaction contingencies indicate the absence or relatively
decreased influence of actions on oneself (vertical arrows) or the other
(oblique arrows), while solid lines indicate the presence of such
influences. The temporal sequence of the social interaction is shown
from top to bottom.
In this respect, machine learning approaches might prove to be
particularly helpful as they allow to go beyond a mere mapping
cognitive functions to brain regions based on differences in acti-
vation levels, but are sensitive to activity pattern differences (e.g.,
Kriegeskorte et al., 2006).
A particularly pertinent example of the putative relationship
between a cognitive phenomenon that first becomes manifest as
part of “online” social interaction, but is known to constitute
a precursor and may, thus, turn into more explicit, “offline”
social cognition is the phenomenon of “joint attention”. As
indicated above, “joint attention” is an interactively constituted
phenomenon that occurs when two agents coordinate their visual
attention (e.g., Schilbach et al., 2010). Furthermore, joint atten-
tion constitutes a developmental milestone, which is known to
precede other social cognitive abilities (Charman et al., 2000),
such as the ability to explicitly represent others’ mental states (as
assessed e.g., by means of the False Belief task; cf. Wimmer and
Perner, 1983). Based on the idea of a psychological continuity
between the phenomenon of gaze-based joint attention and other,
later-developing explicit social cognitive competencies, one could,
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therefore, hypothesize that the neural correlates of participation
in gaze-based joint attention are co-opted for other functions
during ontogeny. It may, therefore, bear resemblance with the
neural correlates of explicit social cognition.
In order to address this question, participants could be
involved in two-part fMRI studies similar to the rationale detailed
above (Section Investigating the Neurobiological Correlates of
Social Interaction and Observation): in a first part, subjects are
asked to participate in a more implicit, gaze-based social interac-
tion task, which e.g., could involve jointly attending to an object
“together” with someone else (as compared to looking at an object
different from the one the other is attending to). In a second
part, participants will be asked to perform explicit social cognitive
tasks, which e.g., could involve contemplating and naming the
mental states of a human individual presented on screen (as com-
pared to guessing her age) while also undergoing neuroimaging.
In line with an approach adopted by Knops et al. (2009), machine
learning algorithms could be employed to investigate this type of
combined data set: here, a classifier could be trained that reliably
separates brain states associated with distinguishable phases of the
social interaction on the whole brain level (e.g., jointly attending
vs. not jointly attending; leading the interaction vs. following the
other). In a next step, it could then be tested whether the exact
same classifier—without further training—would generalize to
the second fMRI data set, based upon the idea that similar neural
mechanisms and computations could underlie both participation
in social interaction and social observation (Anderson, 2010;
Schilbach et al., 2013). Based upon the idea that interaction-
related network activity may be related or even a precursor for
abilities of more detached social perception and observation, one
would expect the social interaction-trained classifier to perform
at a better-than-chance level on the social observation-associated
data set (Figure 2). Thereby, this approach would allow to test
whether the same neural mechanisms that are engaged during
online social cognition are also put to use in situations of offline
social cognition.
FIGURE 2 | Schematic depiction of an information-based
neuroimaging approach to investigate the relationship of the neural
correlates of social interaction and observation. (A) A machine learning
algorithm employing a searchlight approach (e.g., Kriegeskorte et al., 2006)
is trained to separate brain states obtained during a social interaction task.
(B) The machine learning algorithm is then used to classify a separately
obtained data set, which includes brain states measured during social
observation.
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A similar type of experiment could be also be conducted to
further investigate the MNS: in the context of controversy about
the existence of this neural system in the human brain, activation-
based findings have often been cited to in order to defend the view
that we use our own motor system to perceive and understand
the actions of others. While this type of neurofunctional isomor-
phism has been taken to suggest that the same neural mechanism
is at work in both cases (interaction and observation), such a
claim, one could argue, is beyond the scope of activation-based
neuroimaging, because it only investigates whether the same brain
regions show comparable levels of activation (i.e., where in the
brain the cognitive process is localized), but not whether the same
neural computations are relevant (i.e., how the brain realizes a
certain function). Here, again multivariate or machine learning
investigations could help to shed new light onto this question (cf.
Etzel et al., 2008).
TACKLING THE “TWO-BRAIN CHALLENGE”
As outlined above, a large portion of previous work in social
neuroscience has studied behavior and brain activity of indi-
viduals in isolation or as passive by-standers of social interac-
tions (Schilbach et al., 2013). Recent developments towards a
truly social neuroscience have, therefore, tried to establish what
the next important steps of the field could be. One sugges-
tion has been that the development of adequate experimental
paradigms to investigate real-time social interactions will be
of key importance (Wilms et al., 2010; Pfeiffer et al., 2013b).
Useful paradigms should be ecologically valid, interactive and
emotionally engaging while at the same time offering a high
degree of experimental control. In addition to this, steps should
be taken to go beyond testing individual brains, even though
testing the brain of one person who is immersed in a life-
like, real-time social interaction would already constitute a step
forward (see Schilbach et al., 2013 for the difference between
second-person and two-person neuroscience). An important chal-
lenge of two- (or multiple) person setups, however, consists
in finding adequate and useful behavioral markers to quantify
interpersonal aspects of the social interaction (cf. Konvalinka
and Roepstorff, 2012). Here, a recent technical development in
our group—inspired by previous work, which was successful
in quantifying processes of interpersonal gaze coupling (e.g.,
Richardson et al., 2007; Jermann et al., 2010)—has involved
linking up two eyetrackers via a local area network to form a
“dual eyetracking” system (Barisic et al., 2013; Pfeiffer et al.,
2013b), which enables real-time gaze-based social interactions of
two individuals represented by virtual characters (Figure 3). In
this setup, the gaze of two participants can be tracked contin-
uously during the performance of joint tasks (e.g., two-person
perceptual decision-making tasks). Apart from individual task
performance (indicated by e.g., button presses), the eyetrack-
ing data from both participants can be analyzed to generate a
measure or behavioral marker of the degree of interpersonal
coupling (e.g., by assessing gaze recurrence; Anderson et al.,
2013). Such a continuous measure of interpersonal coordina-
tion could be related to task performance in future studies,
but also to the subjective confidence of participants during
decisions. Furthermore, this trial-by-trial behavioral marker of
FIGURE 3 | Dual eyetracking setup. Two eyetracking devices are linked via
a local area network (LAN), which allows to simultaneously measure two
study participants engaged in a mediated gaze-based interaction (each
participant is represented by a virtual character for the respective other).
Taken from: Barisic et al. (2013).
interpersonal coordination could be used in future neuroimaging
studies that employ the dual eyetracking setup to investigate its
neural correlates in either one, or both of the brains of the two
interactors.
With regard to the latter case of attempting to investigate
the neural correlates of social interaction in two interactors’
brains at the same time, it has been suggested by Konvalinka
and Roepstorff (2012) that machine learning could be a partic-
ularly powerful tool: in particular, such algorithms could help
to elucidate whether in certain situations of an ongoing social
encounter data from two brains is better at predicting social
behavior than when the two brains are considered in isolation,
thereby tackling the so-called “two-brain challenge”. On the other
hand, more conventional analysis of neuroimaging data (e.g.,
univariate approaches as part of a general linear model) could
also still be viable: using the above described dual eyetracking
setup, for instance, a behavioral marker of interpersonal cou-
pling could be used as a parametric regressor to investigate
whether activity changes in certain brain regions (in one or both
brains) is correlated with the extent of behavioral interpersonal
coupling.
CONCLUSIONS
In this Hypothesis and Theory Article, I have pointed towards
current challenges and open questions in the burgeoning field
of social neuroscience. In my view, these challenges—at least
in part—consist in moving this field of research towards the
investigation of the neurobiological correlates of real-time social
interactions as the neural mechanisms, which “facilitate or inhibit
social interaction have been difficult to assess” (Insel, 2010).
Here, a variety of approaches might be useful. In the present
article, I have focused on the potential of developing innovative
experimental paradigms to investigate social interaction in a
more ecologically valid and yet controllable fashion. The result-
ing, much needed investigations of real-time social interaction
may initially involve the investigation of an individual brain in
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ongoing social interaction, which would already constitute an
important achievement in comparison to a large number of
currently available studies that focus on social observation. But
future research should also turn towards the inclusion of two
interacting minds (and possibly two brains; e.g., Tognoli et al.,
2007; Dumas et al., 2010, 2012; Saito et al., 2010), even though this
raises difficult issues with regard to an adequate quantification
of interpersonal processes. Elucidating the neural correlates of
social interaction will be a significant achievement in its own
right, but it will also open up another avenue of research that
deals with the investigation of similarities and differences in the
neural correlates of social interaction and observation. Based
upon evidence from developmental psychology and psychiatry,
which suggest a primacy of social interaction over observation
and the idea that neural networks established during social
interaction may be “re-used” during observation, future research
should focus on testing the exact nature of the relationship
between the neural correlates of social interaction and obser-
vation. Combining and comparing the results of interaction-
based paradigms with tasks that require social observation via
the application of different tools for analysis is likely to provide
new insights into this important relationship of online and offline
social cognition.
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